










Income polarization adds to the literature of income distribution by providing information on 
poles of the distribution of income. Yet little is known about this issue in Europe. This paper 
explores income polarization and its determinants for 20 European countries over the period 
2004-2013 based on EU-SILC micro data and Shapley decomposition. The results suggest that 
income polarization is rather low in Europe, although rising in West-EU15 countries during 
2004-2008, but declining afterwards. The opposite development is witnessed for Central and 
Eastern European New Member States. Moreover, in most cases, market income induced higher 
polarization while tax-benefit systems were polarization-reducing. 
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In the comparative welfare state literature, many empirical analyses have relied on popular 
income inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient and median (equivalized) income, to 
investigate changes in the middle of the distribution. Recently, increasing attention has been paid 
to the notion and measurement of income polarization (Petrarca and Ricciuti, 2015; Seshanna 
and Decornez, 2003; Taptué, 2015a, 2015b). Income polarization is different from income 
inequality. While the latter concerns the distances of different individuals in a society from the 
population mean, the former focuses on income differences and income clusters, comparing the 
homogeneity within a group with the overall heterogeneity of a given population (Castro, 2003). 
Suppose that a distribution is divided into several groups. When individual incomes in a group 
become less dispersed, within group income inequality would be lower, therefore leading to lower 
total income inequality. However, clustering of individual incomes towards poles means a higher 
polarization. The concept of income polarization is also different from ethnic or job polarization, 
since in the latter case people are divided into groups by ethnic background or job rather than 
income. So far economists usually focus on income polarization, which refer to the disappearance 
of the middle of the income distribution (Gornick and Jäntti, 2013). 
The basic idea of a polarization indicator is to capture the potential conflict in a given 
distribution (Duro, 2005b; Esteban and Ray, 1999, 2011). A well-off middle class is important to 
every society since it is associated with high income, high economic growth and social and 
political stability (Easterly, 2001; Pressman, 2007). In contrast, high income polarization may lead 
to the emergence of social conflict, social unrest and tension since it implies a ‘divided society’ 
(Duro, 2005a; Esteban and Ray, 1994, 1999; Gradín, 2000; Zhang and Kanbur, 2001). While both 
income polarization and income inequality reflect the changes in the middle of the income 
distribution, it is income polarization that may give rise to social tension and social and political 
conflict (Esteban and Ray, 1994).  
Besides social unrest and conflict, income polarization may generate several harms. First of 
all, a highly income polarized society means less social mobility since the relatively poor may face 
difficulties in moving up the income ladder (Motiram and Sarma, 2014). Income polarization 
further affects economic growth (Brzezinski, 2013; Ezcurra, 2009). One reason is that social 
conflict and political instability underlying income polarization may negatively disrupt market 
activities and labor relations and reduce the security of property rights (Keefer and Knack, 2002). 
Moreover, income polarization harms health since increase in social tension and conflict creates 
psychosocial stress and reduces the provision of certain public goods (Pérez and Ramos, 2010).  
The issue of income polarization has received wide attention outside Europe, for instance in 
China (Araar, 2008; Zhang and Kanbur, 2001), in India (Chakravarty and Majumder, 2001; 
Motiram and Sarma, 2014), in Nigeria (Awoyemi and Araar, 2009; Clementi et al., 2015), in Latin 
American countries (Deutsch et al., 2014; Gasparini et al., 2008) and in more developed countries 
like the United States and Canada (D’Ambrosio and Wolff, 2001; Foster and Wolfson, 1992, 
2010). However, studies on income polarization for European countries are relatively rare. 
Especially, little attention has been paid to income polarization in Central and Eastern European 
New Member States (CEE NMS). In literature only case studies have been applied for Denmark 
(Hussain, 2009), Germany (Gigliarano and Mosler, 2009), Italy (D’Ambrosio, 2001; Poggi and 
Silber, 2010), Poland (Brzezinski, 2011) and Spain (Gradín, 2000). Few cross-country 
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comparisons can be found for a limited number of European countries (Atkinson and Brandolini, 
2013; Brzezinski, 2013; Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio, 2010; Esteban et al., 2007; Seshanna and 
Decornez, 2003).  
Hence, we first make a contribution to the literature to track the trends in income 
polarization in 20 European countries, including the CEE NMS. With respect to the recent 
European Union (EU) enlargement it is particularly interesting to see how the CEE NMS 
compare to the well-established welfare states of Western Europe. We split the time-series 2004-
2013 into two, using 2008 as the mid-point to investigate effects before and since the Great 
Recession. 
Second, we add to the existing literature on the relationship between income polarization and 
income inequality by using cross sectional time series data for the 20 European countries between 
2004 and 2013. We decompose income polarization by the identification-alienation framework 
proposed by Duclos et al. (2004). As such, we examine to what extent changes in income 
polarization are driven by changes in income inequality between groups (alienation) and changes 
in identification within groups. Hussain (2009) shows that the increasing alienation matters more 
for the increasing polarization in Denmark between 1984 and 2002. 
Furthermore, the impact of the tax-benefit system on income inequality indicators as the 
Gini coefficient has been widely studied, but not the impact on income polarization. Only Araar 
(2008) decomposes income polarization at one moment in time for China, and Gradín (2000), 
and Wang and Wan (2015) study country-cases of Spain and China, respectively. Therefore, the 
third contribution of our paper lies in the decomposition of the changes in income polarization 
by income source for a large group of European countries and over time. Moreover, we apply a 
Shapley growth-redistribution decomposition method. This method has been used in studies on 
poverty (Baye, 2006), but not on income polarization. Specifically, we are interested in how labor 
income, capital income, social transfers, and taxes are related to the changes in income 
polarization. It has been pointed out that there has been pervasive job polarization in the EU, 
resulting in unequally distributed and polarizing market income (Goos et al., 2009; Massari et al., 
2013). Since market income is the main component of disposable income, polarization of market 
income may also lead to polarization of disposable income. In addition to labor income, business 
and property income also contribute to unequally distributed income (Paul, 2004). The tax-
benefit system is the other driving force offsetting most of the increase of disposable income 
inequality (Wang et al., 2012, 2014). Differences in the form and structure of welfare state 
provisions or changes in taxation might contribute to changes in income polarization (Hamnett, 
1996).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents approaches of 
measuring income polarization and decomposition methods. Section 3 describes our data (EU-
SILC). Section 4 contains empirical analyses on both the level and change in income polarization 
in 20 European countries for the period 2004-2013. Section 5 presents the decomposition results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Income polarization and income inequality 
2.1 Polarization indicators 
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So far a number of income polarization indicators has been put forward. These indicators can be 
generally classified into two families: bipolarization and multi-peaked polarization. First, 
bipolarization describes the process in which the middle class diminishes while clusters move to 
the two opposite poles. Literature on bipolarization can be traced back to Foster and Wolfson 
(1992, 2010). Polarization indicators proposed by Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio (2010), 
Chakravarty and Majumder (2001), Deutsch et al. (2007), Lasso de la Vega et al. (2010), 
Rodriguez and Salas (2003) and Wang and Tsui (2000) also belong to the family of the 
bipolarization indicators. The most notable Foster and Wolfson (𝐹𝑊) indicator is expressed as 
follows: 




Where 𝐺𝐵  is inter group inequality and 𝐺𝑊  is intra group inequality. The population is 
divided into two groups by the median. 
𝜇
𝑚
 is a simple measure of income skewness as the ratio of 
mean and median income. It is clear from formula (1) that the bipolarization indicator can 
increase in three cases: (a) greater distance between persons with an income level below the 
median and those above the median (higher 𝐺𝐵); (b) persons below and/ above the median are 
more alike (lower 𝐺𝑊); (c) persons with top incomes are further away from the middle.  
 Secondly, multi-peaked polarization indicators attempt to capture the formation of income 
groups clustering around any arbitrary number of groups. Leading studies include D’Ambrosio 
(2001), Duclos et al. (2004), Esteban and Ray (1994), Esteban et al. (1999, 2007) and Poggi and 
Silber (2010). Especially, Esteban and Ray (1994) derive the ‘identification-alienation’ framework 
to assess individuals’ identity with one another belonging to the same group and alienation from 
those belonging to other groups. In societies where income groups are far apart from each other, 
they are likely to have different preferences for redistribution. Such distances will give rise to a 
feeling of alienation, which may lead to the lack of understanding of and tolerance for other 
income groups. Such alienation brings about societal tension. Additionally, as income groups are 
internally more homogenous, their members identify more closely to others within the same 
group and have stronger feelings of belonging to their group, which in turn may also increase 
societal tension. Based on this framework, more polarization arises in case of stronger inter group 
heterogeneity (alienation) and intra group homogeneity (identification).  
Suppose the original distribution consists of 𝑛  groups where group 𝑖 ( 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 … , 𝑛 ) has 
population 𝑝𝑖 and mean income 𝜇𝑖. The Esteban and Ray (𝐸𝑅) indicator is defined as: 






|𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑗| 
 
(2) 
where 𝐾 and 𝛼 are constants with 𝐾 > 0 and 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1.6].1 Within the ‘identification-alienation’ 
framework, the identification (𝐼𝐷) of group 𝑖 and alienation (𝐴𝐿) between group 𝑖 and group 𝑗 are 
defined as 𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖
𝛼 and 𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑗 = |𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑗|. The selected sensitivity parameter 𝛼 reflects the cohesion 
within a group. The higher 𝛼 gives more weight to homogeneity within group in the measurement 
of polarization. As the individuals identify themselves more closely to others within the same 
group and have stronger feeling to belong to their group, social tension and political conflict may 
increase (Pérez and Ramos, 2010). Meanwhile, the higher 𝛼 is, the larger is the departure of the 𝐸𝑅 
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indicator from income inequality. The 𝐸𝑅  indicator becomes the well-known Gini coefficient 
when 𝛼 = 0. 
However, when applying the 𝐸𝑅 indicator, the number of income groups n is decided by the 
researcher rather than driven by data. Later, Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999, 2007) extend the 
polarization indicator: 












| −  𝛽(𝐺 − 𝐺𝐵) 
 
(3) 
Where 𝜇 is the mean income of the original distribution. 𝐺 is the inequality of the original 
distribution and 𝐺𝐵 is the inter group inequality. 𝛽 is a constant reflecting the internal cohesion of 
the groups. The first term coincides with formation of the 𝐸𝑅 index. The difference between 𝐺 and 
𝐺𝐵 in the second term approximately estimates the intra group inequality, therefore expressing 
the error associated with the grouping process. Adding the second term can decrease the bias as a 
result of inaccurate groupings (Duro, 2005b).  
Both the 𝐸𝑅 indicator and the 𝐸𝐺𝑅 indicator are based on a discrete, finite set of income 
groups. This generates two drawbacks. Conceptually, a discrete, finite number of points presents 
an unpleasant discontinuity. Practically, difficulty arises when the population in one group could 
also be regarded as population in other groups (Duclos et al., 2004). To overcome the two 











The alienation ingredient (𝐴𝐿) is defined as: 
?̂?(𝑣𝑖) = ?̂? + 𝑣𝑖 [(
1
𝑛
) (2𝑖 − 1) − 1] − (
1
𝑛






where 𝜇 ̂  is the sample mean and income 𝑣𝑖  is ordered such that 𝑣1 ≤ 𝑣2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑣 . The 
alienation ingredient is two times the Gini coefficient. 𝑓(𝑣𝑖)  is estimated by non-parametric 
estimation transformed from a Gaussian kernel, which estimates the income density at income 
level 𝑣𝑖: 



















with the bandwidth ℎ =  √𝛼
10 4.7
√𝑛
𝜎; 𝜎 is the standard error of the normalized incomes.2 The 
constant 𝛼 expresses the weight given to the identification ingredient (𝐼𝐷) of the framework. The 
higher 𝛼 is, the stronger homogeneity the individuals feel to others within the same group. Duclos 
et al. (2004) impose additional axioms on the polarization measure. To meet these axioms, 𝛼 
must be bounded: 𝛼 ∈ [0.25, 1].  
The 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator has been used widely (e.g. Hussain, 2009, Brzezinski, 2011, Wang and 
Wan, 2015, Wang et al., 2015). We also apply this indicator based on formula (4) throughout the 
paper. Following common practice, the value of 𝛼  = 0.5 is chosen. Polarization indicators 
measured by 𝐹𝑊  (based on formula (1)), 𝐸𝐺𝑅  (based on formula (3)) and the 𝐷𝐸𝑅  (based on 
formula (4)) with different values of 𝛼 would be accounted for as a sensitivity check (results are 




2.2 The relationship between income polarization and income inequality: Decomposition by the 
identification-alienation framework 
As the Gini coefficient, income polarization indicators lie between 0 and 1. Income polarization 
and Gini equal 0 for perfectly distributed income. When income polarization (Gini) increases, the 
society becomes more polarized (unequal). Both income inequality and income polarization are 
sensitive to changes in the middle class. However, the two indicators are different. Income 
polarization is closer to the notion of segregation than income inequality (Esteban and Ray, 
1994). Income polarization places both emphasis on intra group homogeneity (identification) 
and inter group heterogeneity (alienation). As such, income polarization depicts the extent of 
similarities among members in a group and the distances between groups. As suggested by Pérez 
and Ramos (2010), it is inequality between relevant population subgroups, i.e. alienation, rather 
than simply overall population inequality, would increase the differences in preferences for 
redistribution and thus lead to disagreement and conflict. Similarly, the more identity the 
members feel to their income groups, the more likely societal tension would increase. 
Income polarization and income inequality may not go hand in hand. Both inequality and 
polarization will decline if there is an ‘equalizing transfer’ of income from an individual above the 
median to an individual with income below the median. However, inequality and polarization 
might diverge when there are equalizing transfers entirely on one side of the median (Wolfson, 
1994, 1997). With two or more groups, income polarization rises when inter group inequality 
increases or when intra group inequality decreases. The latter case can best describe the difference 
between income polarization and income inequality since it is violated by all standard inequality 
indicators (Brzezinski, 2013). 
Nevertheless, income polarization and income inequality are highly correlated. Usually 
increasing inequality has negative impacts on the growth of median income, leading to a 
‘squeezed middle’ (polarization), although there have been widely varying experiences across 
countries (Thewissen et al., 2015). In formula (4), the 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator is equal to the popular Gini 
coefficient of inequality if 𝛼 = 0. In practice, low values of 𝛼 should produce the values of the 𝐷𝐸𝑅 
indices that are close to the values of Gini, while values of 𝛼 close to 1 lead potentially to the 
highest disparity between Gini and the 𝐷𝐸𝑅  indices. Furthermore, according to Duclos et al. 
(2004), the 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator can be expressed as: 
𝐷𝐸𝑅 = 𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐼𝐷 ∗ (1 + 𝜌) (7) 
The alienation ingredient 𝐴𝐿 is two times the Gini coefficient (see formula (5)). 𝐼𝐷 represents 
the summation of 𝑓(𝑣𝑖)𝛼+1. 𝜌 is the normalized covariance between 𝐴𝐿and 𝐼𝐷. This formula implies 
that the 𝐷𝐸𝑅 can be decomposed into three components: the alienation ingredient 𝐴𝐿 (inequality) 
and the identification ingredient 𝐼𝐷 and the normalized covariance between the two.  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between income polarization and income inequality is 
mixed. Ravallion and Chen (1997) and Zhang and Kanbur (2001) suggest that, contrary to the 
theoretical expectations, the polarization indicators do not generate very different results from the 
standard inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient. Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006), 
and Brzezinski (2013), however, provide evidence that inequality and polarization indices differ 
empirically and in significant ways. For instance, based on micro data for more than 70 countries 
over 1960-2005, Brzezinski (2013) finds that while the impact of income inequality on economic 




2.3 Decomposition of polarization change by income source: Shapley growth-redistribution 
framework 
Former, extensive literature on ‘welfare state retrenchment’ that has emerged over the last decades 
seems to imply that welfare states have become less redistributive (Immervoll and Richardson, 
2011, also published in OECD, 2011). Recent studies and data, on contrary, show that most 
welfare states became more redistributive (see also Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005; Wang et al., 
2014). Welfare states have not compensated completely for the rise in inequality of market 
income among households, but most have done so to some degree. By and large, welfare states 
have worked the way they were designed to work. It is markets, not redistribution policies that 
have become more inegalitarian. It should be noted here that because tax-benefit systems are 
generally progressive, one could expect that higher market income inequality automatically leads 
to more redistribution, even without policy actions (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011; Wang et 
al., 2014). But what about income polarization? 
This paper examines changes in income polarization across 20 European countries for the 
period 2004-2013 decomposed into three income components: market income (labor and 
capital), social benefits (sum of unemployment benefits, old-age and survivor pension benefits, 
sickness and disability benefits, education allowances, and minimum income protection), and 
taxes and social contributions to households. To decompose the changes of income polarization 
by income source, we use Shapley decomposition which considers all possible sequences of 
changes of income sources, and growth-redistribution decomposition which shows the effects of 
income growth and reallocation on polarization separately; see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.  
 
2.3.1 Shapley decomposition  
The idea of the Shapley decomposition procedure is precisely to average the contribution of each 
income component over all the possible sequences considering the combination of changes in all 
other components. Therefore, the Shapley decomposition allows overcoming the path 
dependency problem: the contribution of each factor (except when there are only two income 
sources) clearly depends on their order in the elimination process. Shapley decomposition has 
been discussed by many scholars but mainly in the fields of poverty and inequality (Baye, 2006; 
Shorrocks, 2013). Instead, decomposition of income polarization receives little attention in the 
existing literature. Therefore, this study relies on Shapley decomposition and further 
decomposition into growth and reallocation effects to estimate the contributions of specific 
factors to income polarization change over time. Similar to inequality and other social indicators, 
there are two broad categories related to the issue of decomposing income polarization by the 
Shapley value. The first category deals with decomposing income polarization by subgroups such 
as by age, sex, or race. Here we consider applying the Shapley value to the second category of 
decomposing income polarization, namely, to evaluate the different components of total income. 
Specifically, we disaggregate total income into several income components, such as market 
income, social transfers and taxes. Our target is to examine the contribution of each income 
component to the aggregate polarization change over time.3 
8 
 
Suppose there are only two income sources 𝑥 and 𝑦. Total income equals to the sum of 𝑥 and 
𝑦. Let 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) denote the polarization depending on the two income sources 𝑥 and 𝑦. Polarization 
at time 𝑡  and 𝑡 + 1  can thus be expressed as 𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡)  and 𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1)  respectively. Hence, the 
change in polarization between the two periods can be expressed as follows: 
∆𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) 









𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) −
1
2
𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) 









𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+1) −
1
2
𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+1) 
       =
1
2
[𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+1)] +
1
2
[𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡)] 
       +
1
2
[𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) −  𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡)] +
1
2
[𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡)] 





[𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+1)] +
1
2




[𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡)] +
1
2
[𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡)] 
 (9) 
Based on the formula, the change in polarization is contributed by the change ∆𝑝(𝑥) led by 𝑥 
and ∆𝑝(𝑦) led by 𝑦. ∆𝑝(𝑥) is the average effect 𝑥 in all sequences (there are two possible sequences 
in the two factors’ case, namely 𝑥 changed first and 𝑦 changed first) (Wang and Wan, 2015). 
Similarly, ∆𝑝(𝑦)  is the average effect of 𝑦  in all possible sequences. The extension of the 
decomposition over time for three income sources 𝑥, 𝑦 and 𝑧 (total income = 𝑥+ 𝑦 + 𝑧) can be 



























Source: Wan (2006) and own extension. 
 
First, consider 𝑥 changes from 𝑥𝑡  to 𝑥𝑡+1, holding 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡 as unchanged (route 1). We can 
thus obtain a counterfactual polarization 𝑝𝑡+1 . The difference between 𝑝𝑡+1 and 𝑝𝑡  is the 
contribution of the changes in 𝑥 , namely ∆𝑝(𝑥) . Similarly, we can have three other ∆𝑝(𝑥) 
corresponding to three other possible consequences (routes 6, 8 and 12). Second, the effect by the 
changes in 𝑥 on polarization is the average of the four ∆𝑝(𝑥). Finally, we can compute the effects of 
changes in 𝑦 (average of ∆𝑝(𝑦) from routes 2, 4, 9 and 11) and in 𝑧 (average of ∆𝑝(𝑧)from routes 3, 
5, 6 and 10) on polarization.  
Likewise, with respect to four or more determinants, the marginal contribution of each 
component is calculated based on all possible routes considering the combination of changes in 
all other determinants. For instance, for income component 𝑥𝑘 ∈ {𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑘 , ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛}, the marginal 
effect of 𝑥𝑘  over time is the average of ∆𝑝(𝑥𝑘)  obtained from all routes with all possible 
combination of changes in other determinants. More specifically, for each of the other 
components, there are two status in period 𝑡  and 𝑡 + 1, e.g. 𝑥1𝑡  and 𝑥1𝑡+1 . Therefore, there are 
2𝑛−1 combinations of changes with regards to other 𝑛 − 1  determinants. Using Shapley 
decomposition, all contributions can be added up to 100% of the total changes in polarization 





(11) (12) (10) 
𝑥𝑡+1,  𝑦𝑡+1,  𝑧𝑡 ⇒ 𝑝𝑡+1 𝑥𝑡+1,  𝑦𝑡 ,  𝑧𝑡+1 ⇒ 𝑝𝑡+1 𝑥𝑡 ,  𝑦𝑡+1,  𝑧𝑡+1 ⇒ 𝑝𝑡+1 
𝑥𝑡+1,  𝑦𝑡+1,  𝑧𝑡+1 ⇒ 𝑝𝑡+1 
𝑥𝑡+1,  𝑦𝑡 ,  𝑧𝑡 ⇒ 𝑝𝑡+1 𝑥𝑡,  𝑦𝑡+1,  𝑧𝑡 ⇒ 𝑝𝑡+1 𝑥𝑡 ,  𝑦𝑡 ,  𝑧𝑡+1 ⇒ 𝑝𝑡+1 
∆𝑝(𝑦) 
𝑥𝑡 ,  𝑦𝑡 ,  𝑧𝑡 ⇒ 𝑝𝑡 
∆𝑝(𝑥) ∆𝑝(𝑧) ∆𝑝(𝑦) 
∆𝑝(𝑧) ∆𝑝(𝑥) ∆𝑝(𝑧) ∆𝑝(𝑥) ∆𝑝(𝑦) 






2.3.2 Further decomposition: growth and reallocation effects  
The partial effect of each income component on changes of income polarization can further be 
divided into a growth component and a reallocation component. This dynamic decomposition 
procedure examines how economic growth contributes to a change in income polarization over 
time, and assesses whether and to what extent the effect of this growth is attenuated or reinforced 
by a change in inequality. Baye (2006), Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Kakwani (2000) put 
forward a growth-redistribution decomposition framework to decompose a change in poverty in 
growth and redistribution effects. The growth effect gives the effect on poverty of the change in 
the mean income while holding the Lorenz curve constant. The redistribution effect represents 
poverty changes due to resource reallocation, that is, to give the change in poverty due to change 
in the Lorenz curve when the mean income remains the same. Furthermore, Kakwani (2000) 
imposes three axioms to define the nature of the growth-redistribution framework. These axioms 
help to avoid the residual term and the ‘benchmark period’ problem (problem related to 
nominating the initial or terminal year as the reference, see Appendix D for details).4 Similarly, we 
incorporate this axiomatic technique in our analysis of decomposing the change of income 
polarization. However, we use the term ‘reallocation effect’ instead of the ‘redistribution effect’ to 
distinguish the redistribution component in the growth-redistribution decomposition framework 
for market income from the redistribution effect of social benefits and taxes (the sum of the 
redistribution component and growth component in the growth-redistribution decomposition 
framework). Let 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) be the polarization level at time 𝑡 with income source 𝑥. 𝜇𝑥𝑡denotes the 
mean source income 𝑥 at time 𝑡 and 𝐿𝑥𝑡 indexes the Lorenz curve of income 𝑥 at time 𝑡. Change in 
income polarization from time 𝑡  to time 𝑡 + 1  is thus expressed as ∆𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡)  =
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) . Let 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1)  denote the growth effect from the year 𝑡  to 𝑡 + 1  and 
𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) denote the reallocation effect. The growth and reallocation effects can be disentangled 
for the change in our polarization indicator, as shown below: 
∆𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡) 
             = 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) 
             =
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) +
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) −
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) −
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) 
            +
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) −
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) +
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) −
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) 
            =
1
2
{[𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)] + [𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1)]} 
            +
1
2
{[𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑥𝑡)] + [𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)]} 
𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) =
1
2
{[𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)] + [𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1)]} (10) 
𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) =
1
2
{[𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑥𝑡)] + [𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)]} 
(11) 
The growth effect is computed as the mean of two effects: (1) the growth effect when the 
initial redistribution (Lorenz curve) remains the same and the growth effect when the final 
redistribution (Lorenz curve) remains the same. Similarly, the reallocation effect is computed as 
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the mean of two effects: (1) the reallocation effect when the initial mean income remains the same 
and the reallocation effect when the final mean income remains the same.  
3. Underlying micro data from EU-SILC 
The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) is the EU reference 
source for micro income data. EU-SILC provides an up-to-date source for comparative research 
on income and living conditions in the EU. This dataset contains internationally and cross-
temporarily comparable variables for all EU member states and some other countries. EU-SILC is 
unique since it offers information on a range of social indicators. Many EU indicators designed to 
monitor poverty, income inequality and social inclusion in the EU are based on EU-SILC. EU-
SILC has been widely used in internationally and cross-temporarily comparative research for EU 
member states and some other countries.  
It should be noted that there are considerable differences between participating countries in 
EU-SILC in terms of sample design, sample frame and data source (Goedemé, 2013). 
Furthermore, the data collection approach varies over time. For instance, prior to 2007, some of 
the countries provided no information on gross incomes (France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, 
Spain). Data from these countries is not used. Moreover, the analysis of trends of income 
polarization is restricted to European countries due to data availability. 20 countries are involved 
in our empirical analysis, including 18 European Member States and 2 non-EU members, namely 
Iceland and Norway. EU-SILC 2004-2013 data are taken into account. We split the period into 
two using 2008 as the mid-point to investigate effects before and since the Great Recession. 
The reference population of EU-SILC consists of private households residing in the 
participating countries at the moment of selection. Detailed information on individual and 
household characteristics as well as income by source is contained. We first compute the 
polarization measure for household disposable income, equivalized using the square-root scale. 
Disposable income is defined as the sum of gross market income and cash benefits, net of direct 
taxes and social insurance contributions. In EU-SILC, all income information refers to the 
‘income reference period’. Except for Ireland and the United Kingdom, the income reference 
period is the 12 months of the calendar year prior to the survey year. In Ireland, the income 
reference period covers the last 12 months prior to the interview. In the United Kingdom, current 
weekly or monthly income is annualized and the income reference period presents the year of the 
survey (Eurostat, 2008).  
Table 1 presents the components composing of disposable household income in our dataset. 
All incomes are expressed in gross values and converted into euros of 2005 (deflating by a 
country-specific consumer price index taken from World Bank, 2013). We follow the common 
practice (e.g. Lohmann, 2011) to exclude the non-positive disposable incomes. No top–coding of 
income has been applied. To calculate the level of income polarization across countries and over 
time, we use the 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator. The value of  𝛼 =0.5 is chosen. In the sensitivity analysis, we 
compute the 𝐹𝑊  and 𝐸𝐺𝑅  indicators and the 𝐷𝐸𝑅  indicator for a range of values of 𝛼 . 
Information of the number of observations in each country, mean values of disposable income 
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4. Trends in income polarization in Europe 
Table 2 shows estimates for the polarization indicator for each country and the direction of 
movement in the indicator in the two sub-periods 2004-2008 and 2008-2013. The year 2008 is 
used as the mid-point to investigate effects before and since the Great Recession. In this paper, we 
compute asymptotic variance and standard errors for the 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator with the help of the 
DASP package in Stata (Duclos et al., 2004). All standard errors are between 0.001 and 0.009. In 
addition, all polarization indicator estimates are significantly different from zero at 0.05 










Table 2: Polarization indicator 2004, 2008 and 2013 (𝐷𝐸𝑅𝛼= 0.5) 
      Level polarization indicator Change over time 
  Country 
Available 
in EU-SILC 
2004 2008 2013 2004-2008 2008-2013 2004-2013 
   





    
  
AT Austria 2004-2013 0.183 0.188 0.190 2.8% 0.9% 3.8%*** 
BE Belgium 2004-2013 0.188 0.194 0.188 3.1% -2.9% 0.1% 
DE Germany 2005-2013 0.191 0.193 0.194 1.4% 0.5% 1.9% 
DK Denmark 2004-2013 0.166 0.191 0.175 15.4%** -8.2% 5.9% 
FI Finland 2004-2013 0.187 0.189 0.187 1.0% -1.1% -0.1% 
IE Ireland 2004-2013 0.216 0.215 0.202 -0.5% -5.8%** -6.2%*** 
LU Luxembourg 2004-2013 0.189 0.212 0.198 11.9%*** -6.5%** 4.7% 
NL  Netherlands 2005-2013 0.172 0.181 0.171 5.4%** -5.2%*** -0.1% 




0.223 0.217 0.202 -2.8% -6.9%** -9.5%** 
Mean-10 
  












    
  




0.186 0.178 0.177 -4.2%** -0.8% -5.0%** 
EE Estonia 2004-2013 0.220 0.200 0.206 -9.1%** 3.1%* -6.3%* 
HU  Hungary 2005-2013 0.188 0.182 0.187 -3.0% 2.4% -0.6% 
LT  Lithuania 2005-2013 0.219 0.214 0.212 -2.5% -0.6% -3.0% 
PL  Poland 2005-2013 0.217 0.203 0.198 -6.7% -2.2%*** -8.7%*** 
SI  Slovenia 2005-2013 0.172 0.171 0.175 -0.4% 2.4%** 1.9%* 
SK  Slovakia 2005-2013 0.186 0.177 0.176 -4.6% -0.9% -5.4% 
Mean-8 
  
0.198 0.191 0.194 -3.9% 1.6% -2.3% 
   
  
 






    
  
IS Iceland 2004-2013 0.177 0.191 0.176 7.8%** -7.6%* -0.4% 
NO Norway 2004-2013 0.188 0.173 0.164 -7.9% -5.6%*** -13.0%*** 
   
  
 
    
  
Mean-20     0.191 0.192 0.189 0.2% -1.7% -1.5% 
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at 
the 0.1 level. 
 
Table 2 shows rather low levels of income polarization in Europe, relative to for example 
Asian countries with polarization levels mostly above 0.2 (Gochoco-Bautista et al., 2013). A 
modest rise of income polarization is witnessed from 2004 to 2008 for 8 out of 10 West EU 
countries, but a decline afterwards (with the exception of 3 countries). The opposite development 
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is witnessed for CEE NMS: a decline of income polarization from 2004 to 2008 for 7 out of 8 CEE 
NMS countries, but a slight increase afterwards (with the exception of 4 countries). So the pattern 
for West EU countries differs from CEE NMS. Moreover, the changes are significant in most 
countries. Cross-country differences declined over time, especially between 2004 and 2008.6 Our 
empirics show that income polarization in European countries is rather low and stable over time, 
also compared to Asian countries, the developing countries and to a lesser extent the United 
States (Brzezinski, 2013: 35-36). 
 
5. Decomposition results 
5.1 Decomposition of income polarization by the identification-alienation framework 
In Table 3, we present the alienation and identification ingredients for the 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator across 
the 20 European countries in 2013. Note that the alienation (inequality) is the same for all 𝐷𝐸𝑅 
indicators with different values of  𝛼. In addition to the large variation in alienation, differences in 
identification across countries can be detected together with polarization differences. The 
coefficient of variation shows that alienation’s variation across countries is more than 2.5 size of 
the identification’s variation, and 0.6 times larger than that of polarization’s variation. In fact, not 
only across countries, but also for each country and over time, the variation of the alienation is 
greater than that of the identification and the overall polarization. From the coefficient of 
variation we can also infer that cross country variation of income inequality is much higher than 
that of income polarization. Thus, for example, although Norway and Denmark have much lower 
income inequality (𝐴𝐿) than the United Kingdom, income polarization between the countries is 
not that different. This may explain why increases in income polarization in some countries, 
although statistically significant, are much less documented than increases in income inequality.  
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Table 3: 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator, alienation and identification for a range of values for 𝛼, 2013 
 
    𝛼 = 0.25   𝛼 = 0.5   𝛼 = 0.75   𝛼 =1 
Country 𝐴𝐿   𝐷𝐸𝑅 𝐼𝐷 𝜌   𝐷𝐸𝑅 𝐼𝐷 𝜌   𝐷𝐸𝑅 𝐼𝐷 𝜌   𝐷𝐸𝑅 𝐼𝐷 𝜌 
Norway 0.216   0.181 0.929 -0.096   0.164 0.892 -0.150   0.155 0.876 -0.183   0.150 0.873 -0.205 
Netherlands 0.228   0.190 0.926 -0.101   0.171 0.887 -0.151   0.162 0.868 -0.180   0.157 0.862 -0.199 
Denmark 0.240   0.197 0.915 -0.102   0.175 0.862 -0.151   0.163 0.829 -0.180   0.155 0.807 -0.198 
Sweden  0.242   0.199 0.900 -0.085   0.175 0.833 -0.130   0.160 0.784 -0.157   0.149 0.748 -0.175 
Slovenia 0.242   0.200 0.898 -0.080   0.175 0.829 -0.126   0.159 0.779 -0.155   0.148 0.741 -0.176 
Slovakia 0.240   0.200 0.897 -0.071   0.176 0.827 -0.115   0.159 0.776 -0.144   0.148 0.739 -0.164 
Iceland 0.240   0.198 0.913 -0.095   0.176 0.859 -0.146   0.163 0.825 -0.176   0.155 0.803 -0.195 
Czech Republic 0.240   0.198 0.917 -0.100   0.177 0.871 -0.155   0.165 0.848 -0.188   0.159 0.840 -0.209 
Hungary 0.268   0.216 0.887 -0.092   0.187 0.811 -0.141   0.168 0.757 -0.171   0.155 0.716 -0.191 
Finland 0.267   0.214 0.894 -0.104   0.187 0.826 -0.154   0.170 0.779 -0.183   0.159 0.745 -0.201 
Belgium 0.267   0.217 0.884 -0.084   0.188 0.803 -0.125   0.169 0.741 -0.148   0.155 0.692 -0.163 
Austria 0.282   0.223 0.871 -0.091   0.190 0.783 -0.142   0.168 0.719 -0.173   0.152 0.670 -0.193 
Germany 0.287   0.226 0.881 -0.106   0.194 0.801 -0.156   0.174 0.744 -0.184   0.160 0.700 -0.203 
Luxembourg 0.288   0.229 0.882 -0.098   0.198 0.801 -0.144   0.178 0.743 -0.170   0.164 0.699 -0.186 
Poland 0.300   0.235 0.864 -0.091   0.198 0.770 -0.140   0.174 0.700 -0.170   0.157 0.645 -0.189 
United Kingdom 0.301   0.237 0.870 -0.094   0.202 0.782 -0.143   0.179 0.719 -0.172   0.163 0.670 -0.190 
Ireland 0.301   0.236 0.874 -0.101   0.202 0.792 -0.151   0.182 0.735 -0.179   0.168 0.695 -0.197 
Estonia 0.313   0.246 0.858 -0.087   0.206 0.761 -0.137   0.180 0.691 -0.167   0.162 0.637 -0.187 
Lithuania 0.331   0.255 0.856 -0.100   0.212 0.759 -0.153   0.186 0.688 -0.184   0.167 0.634 -0.202 
Cyprus 0.333   0.256 0.876 -0.121   0.219 0.794 -0.173   0.196 0.736 -0.200   0.181 0.693 -0.215 
                                    
Mean 20 0.271   0.218 0.890 -0.095   0.189 0.817 -0.144   0.171 0.767 -0.173   0.158 0.730 -0.192 
Coefficient of variation 0.125   0.099 0.024 -0.110   0.077 0.048 -0.089   0.060 0.072 -0.077   0.049 0.097 -0.070 
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC.  
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5.2  Decomposition of income polarization change by Shapley growth-redistribution 
decomposition method 
Figures 2a-2c show the changes in income polarization (𝐷𝐸𝑅 𝛼= 0.5), further splitting the 
countries into West EU, CEE NMS and other European countries. In each group countries are 
ranked in order of their change in income polarization from largest to smallest. For the three 
main income components, we present the partial effect of each income component which is the 
sum of the partial growth effect and the partial reallocation effect. Between 2004 and 2008, the 
West EU countries observed an increase in income polarization (see Figure 2a). Market income 
contributed to this increase to a large extent. Surprisingly, also social benefits and taxes added to 
more income polarization. CEE NMS, on the contrary, saw a decrease in income polarization on 
average, where the redistribution effects of social benefits and taxes offset the polarization-
increasing factor of market income.  
An opposite trend can be found for the period 2008-2013 (see Figure 2b). Income 
polarization decreased in the West EU countries and this was mainly because of the more 
redistributive effects of social benefits and taxes. The CEE NMS, on the other hand, experienced 
an increase in income polarization since the Great Recession. Market income had a positive 
impact on income polarization, which has not been offset by the effects of social benefits and 
taxes.  
Figure 2c shows the decomposition for the entire period 2004-2013. Income polarization 
increased in 6 out of the 10 West EU countries, while it declined in most of the CEE NMS. Taken 
together, income polarization slightly decreased for the 20-country average. Market income was 
polarization-increasing on average (mainly in West EU countries), while the redistributive effect 
of social benefits and taxes appears to be polarization-reducing, on average. Across countries the 
redistribution effect of social benefits and taxes is more than offsetting the polarization-increasing 
effect of dispersion of market incomes in 20 European countries in the period 2004-2013. 






















Figure 2a: Change in polarization 2004-2008 due to market income, social benefits and taxes 
 
 
Figure 2b: Change in polarization 2008-2013 due to market income, social benefits and taxes 
 
Figure 2c: Change in polarization 2004-2013 due to market income, social benefits and taxes 
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Decomposition results including the (partial) growth effect and the reallocation effect for the 
period 2004-2013 are presented in Table 4. Table 4 shows the changes in income polarization in 
20 countries from 2004/5 to 2013, further splitting the countries into groups (West EU, CEE NMS 
and other European countries). Countries are ranked in order of their change in income 
polarization 2004-2013 from largest to smallest. Ten countries have seen a non-positive change of 
income polarization, although the magnitude is mostly rather small due to the short period under 
study. Some countries show lower (higher) income polarization compared to other countries. 
Table 4 decomposes total change into a growth and reallocation effect by country. For our 
20-country-average polarization decreased in the period 2004-2013. The growth effect on 
polarization was quite small on average, while the reallocation effect appears to be polarization-
reducing. However, cross-country variation is large. 
Our analyses may be seen as an assessment how changes of the generosity of tax-benefit 
systems over the period 2004-2013 have had an impact on income polarization. Table 4 presents 
rather stable income polarization over the decade in most West-EU15 countries, and somewhat 
lower polarization in CEE NMS. While market income has contributed to increasing income 
polarization, the tax-benefit systems in European countries has resulted in reducing income 
polarization through the reallocation effect. We do not find that tax-benefit policies had become 
less effective before or after the Great Recession. Among the total population in European 
countries, both market income polarization (labor and capital) and redistribution from social 
benefits and taxes rose on average. As a result, the tax-benefit systems were more effective in 
offsetting income polarization in 2013 than in the mid-2000’s in all countries, with Cyprus as an 
exception. So, social policy changes made by most European countries in the period 2004-2013 
did have an anti-polarizing effect, even if other factors as market incomes were pushing in the 
other direction. This finding is in line with the work of Hills et al. (2014). Detailed decomposition 
results for the sub-periods 2004-2008 and 2008-2013 are presented in Tables E1 and E2 of 
Appendix E.7  
With respect to the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit systems, our analysis indicates that 
the pattern is diverse across countries. On average across 20 countries, social benefits reduced 
income polarization by 0.003 in the period 2004-2013, while taxes account for a reduction of 
0.002. Previous work showed - as far as social programs in most countries is concerned – that the 
public old-age pensions mitigated over half of the increase in income inequality, while taxes 
slowed down the increase of income inequality by 15 per cent (Wang et al., 2014). The negative 
effect of direct taxes for Czech Republic is also confirmed by Janský et al. (2016). Future research 
might take such a decomposition approach to detect partial effects per social program to the total 
change of income polarization across countries over time. 
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Table 4: Detailed decomposition change 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator 2004-2013 (𝛼= 0.5) 
 











Partial effect: Market 
income 
Partial effect: Social 
Benefit 
Partial effect: Taxes 
  

























        
Sweden  2004-2013 0.164 0.175 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.011 -0.001 -0.008 0.009 -0.002 0.004 
Denmark 2004-2013 0.166 0.175 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.007 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Luxembourg 2004-2013 0.189 0.198 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.002 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
Austria 2004-2013 0.183 0.190 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Germany 2005-2013 0.191 0.194 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Belgium 2004-2013 0.188 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Netherlands 2005-2013 0.172 0.171 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.006 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.004 
Finland 2004-2013 0.187 0.187 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
Ireland 2004-2013 0.216 0.202 -0.013 -0.004 -0.010 0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 
United Kingdom 2005-2013 0.223 0.202 -0.021 0.001 -0.022 -0.024 0.011 0.015 -0.016 0.010 -0.018 
Mean-10 
 
0.188 0.188 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
                       CEE NMS-10 
 
                     
Cyprus 2005-2013 0.199 0.219 0.020 -0.001 0.020 0.004 0.010 -0.002 0.008 -0.003 0.002 
Slovenia 2005-2013 0.172 0.175 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Hungary 2005-2013 0.188 0.187 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.010 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.004 0.000 
Lithuania 2005-2013 0.219 0.212 -0.007 0.001 -0.008 0.015 -0.008 -0.012 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
Czech Republic 2005-2013 0.186 0.177 -0.009 0.004 -0.013 0.004 -0.008 -0.003 0.008 0.002 -0.012 
Slovakia 2005-2013 0.186 0.176 -0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.004 -0.011 -0.012 -0.001 0.009 0.001 
Estonia 2004-2013 0.220 0.206 -0.014 0.000 -0.014 0.015 -0.014 -0.014 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
Poland 2005-2013 0.217 0.198 -0.019 0.000 -0.019 0.014 -0.018 -0.011 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
Mean-8 
 
0.198 0.194 -0.005 0.001 -0.005 0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.002 
                       Other 
                      
Iceland 2004-2013 0.177 0.176 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.010 0.012 0.009 -0.006 0.002 -0.009 
Norway 2004-2013 0.188 0.164 -0.025 -0.001 -0.024 0.012 -0.019 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
  
    
 
                
Mean-20   0.191 0.189 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.002 




The issue of income polarization has been widely discussed outside Europe in recent decades. 
Instead, less attention has been paid to income polarization within Europe. More polarization can 
be associated with a divided society and may lead to increase in social unrest, harm economic 
growth and individual health, and therefore is of special interest in socio-political analysis. 
Meanwhile, a number of studies has applied various decomposition approaches to analyze the 
roles of market income, social benefits and taxes in changes in poverty and inequality. However, 
so far little is known about the roles of these factors in changing income polarization in Europe. 
To deal with these issues, this study first explores the development of income polarization in 20 
European countries over the period 2004-2013, relying on micro data from EU-SILC. Then we 
engage on the relationship between income polarization and income inequality by decomposing 
the income polarization into the identification and alienation ingredients. Finally, we disentangle 
the change of income polarization by income source, such as market income (from labor and 
capital), social transfers, and taxes. The conclusions are as follows:  
First, income polarization is rather low in Europe, compared with that in Asian countries; in 
West EU countries it is even lower than in the CEE NMS. Over the period 2004-2013, income 
polarization is rather stable in European countries. This finding seems to imply that the welfare 
states in Europe is different from other countries and that the harms originated from income 
polarization may not exist in Europe. More specifically, income polarization was rising among the 
West-EU15 countries in the sub-period 2004-2008, but declining afterwards. The CEE NMS 
witnessed an opposite development. The results are robust irrespective of the polarization 
indicator or the sensitivity parameter 𝛼 we choose. We did not analyze why the trends in income 
polarization of CEE NMS differs from the trends in West EU countries,  because this goes behind 
the scope of this empirical paper. 
Second, income polarization is closely associated with income inequality (alienation) but the 
two measures are conceptually and empirically distinguishable. Variation in polarization across 
European countries or over time is much lower than that in inequality (alienation). Variation of 
income polarization between countries and over time can be associated with variation in 
alienation (income inequality), but the effect can be reinforced or offset by identification within 
groups as well as the normalized correlation between alienation and identification. In the end, 
income polarization and income inequality may not go hand in hand. 
Third, to explore the effects of market income, social benefits, and taxes on changes of 
income polarization over 2004-2013, this paper relies on Shapley decomposition and further 
decomposition into growth and reallocation effects. The results vary to a large extent across 
European countries. On average, income polarization was upward driven by market income in 
the period 2004-2013. Conversely, both the tax and social benefit systems were polarization-
reducing. As a result - despite the Great Recession – our income polarization indicator does not 
point at a sizeable increase in 20 European countries over the last decade, because tax-benefit 
systems have offset the increase of market income polarization in European countries. We do not 
find that tax-benefit policies had become less effective after the Great Recession. 
However, our empirical analysis does not show why benefits and taxes have become more (or 
less) redistributive over time in European countries. It can be expected that, as market income 
inequality rises, the tax-benefit systems will automatically have a more redistributive impact 
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because of the progressivity built into these systems (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). But also 
policy changes and demographic changes will certainly explain a part of the changes in 
redistribution. A wide range of factors influence the overall income distribution. Many of these, 
such as demographic change or the distribution of work across households, are not under the 
direct control of policy makers. In assessing the performance of government social policy in terms 
of (income) poverty or inequality reduction it is important to isolate the impact of the most 
relevant factors that policy makers are able to control (see Lambert and Thoresen, 2012), which is 
not done exhaustively in this paper. This might be an important omission if the policy changes 
introduced in the period considered were specifically designed to alter the incentive e.g. to 
increase labor force participation. An extension of the work here could attempt to further isolate 
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1 The α is bounded [0, 1.6] to satisfy the axioms imposed on the ER and other intuitive properties of 
the measure (Esteban and Ray, 1994).  














]. A Gaussian kernel function has a symmetric ‘bell curve’ 
shape. The bandwidth h is a free parameter controlling the width of the ‘bell’ and thus exhibits 





 expresses the height of the curve’s peak. 𝑢 is the expected 
value of 𝑣, indicating the position of the peak centre. 𝑓(𝑣𝑖) then is the average of the sum of 
𝑔(𝑣𝑖) using the income distance 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣𝑗  of two individuals instead of 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢. 
3 One can find decomposition of income polarization by population in literature, see e.g. Araar 
(2008) and Gradín (2000) decompose the polarization by population group. Araar (2008) 
decomposes income polarization by income source as well, but only for China and Nigeria. 
4 The Appendix is added to the on-line version of our paper and is also available via our personal 
web pages at www.economie.leidenuniv.nl. 
5 The Appendix is added to the on-line version of our paper and is also available via our personal 
web pages at www.economie.leidenuniv.nl. 
6 In addition to the 𝐷ER indicator (α = 0.5), we estimateincome polarization utilizing different 
indicators (𝐹W, 𝐸GR) and the 𝐷ER indicator with different values of α (α = 0.25, α = 0.75 and α 
= 1). Although the magnitude of the polarization indicators are different using different 
indicators or different values of α, the overall trends of income polarization estimated by the 𝐷ER 
indicator (α = 0.5) are robust. Detailed information are presented in Tables B1-B3 and Figures B1 
in Appendix B and Table C1 in Appendix C. The Appendix is added to the on-line version of our 
paper and is also available via our personal web pages at www.economie.leidenuniv.nl.  
7 The Appendix is added to the on-line version of our paper and is also available via our personal 
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income in euro (mean) 
Market income 
(share of 2) 
Social benefit 
(share of 2) 
Taxes 
(share of 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
West EU-10 
    
Austria 13,244 22,559 98.9% 36.6% -35.5% 
Belgium 14,601 21,465 100.0% 31.1% -31.1% 
Denmark 13,869 30,875 121.1% 30.4% -51.6% 
Finland 27,888 26,118 106.7% 27.8% -34.5% 
Germany 26,618 21,601 101.9% 34.8% -36.7% 
Ireland 12,646 21,316 90.1% 39.2% -29.2% 
Luxembourg 9,964 36,471 95.1% 34.2% -29.3% 
Netherlands 24,586 23,675 130.8% 28.9% -59.7% 
Sweden 15,174 28,259 104.3% 31.4% -35.8% 
United Kingdom 23,158 18,013 95.7% 32.4% -28.1% 
      
CEE NMS-8 
    
Cyprus 13,275 18,873 85.4% 28.8% -14.2% 
Czech Republic 19,085 7,712 86.3% 29.6% -15.8% 
Estonia 15,003 5,949 91.7% 26.7% -18.4% 
Hungary 25,421 3,747 85.8% 37.5% -23.3% 
Lithuania 11,712 4,506 82.1% 32.7% -14.8% 
Poland 36,413 5,226 93.3% 34.0% -27.3% 
Slovenia 27,265 12,494 100.6% 30.0% -30.6% 
Slovakia 15,456 6,950 82.6% 25.9% -8.6% 
      
Other 
     
Iceland 8,902 16,269 119.0% 20.2% -39.2% 
Norway 15,299 45,523 111.7% 26.3% -38.0% 
 
Note: All incomes are expressed in gross values and converted into euros of 2005.  




Appendix B. Polarization’s sensitivity to different indicators and to different 𝜶 
Table B1. DER, FW and EGR indicators for the 20 European countries, 2004-2013 
Income concept: Equivalized disposable income 
    
Polarization sensitivity parameter: α = 0.5         
Equivalence scale: The modified LIS' equivalence scales       
              
West EU-15 countries             
 
            
Austria (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.183 0.261 0.812 -0.136 0.105 0.073 
2005 0.186 0.264 0.828 -0.152 0.104 0.074 
2006 0.181 0.255 0.824 -0.136 0.104 0.072 
2007 0.184 0.262 0.822 -0.145 0.105 0.074 
2008 0.188 0.266 0.826 -0.146 0.108 0.075 
2009 0.184 0.261 0.821 -0.139 0.106 0.073 
2010 0.187 0.267 0.826 -0.151 0.105 0.075 
2011 0.187 0.268 0.820 -0.150 0.106 0.075 
2012 0.191 0.284 0.789 -0.146 0.114 0.080 
2013 0.190 0.282 0.783 -0.142 0.113 0.079 
              
Belgium (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.188 0.271 0.790 -0.122 0.114 0.077 
2005 0.196 0.282 0.820 -0.154 0.111 0.080 
2006 0.191 0.275 0.809 -0.143 0.110 0.078 
2007 0.188 0.267 0.804 -0.127 0.110 0.076 
2008 0.194 0.282 0.807 -0.148 0.112 0.079 
2009 0.188 0.267 0.807 -0.127 0.110 0.075 
2010 0.188 0.269 0.798 -0.122 0.112 0.076 
2011 0.187 0.266 0.800 -0.123 0.111 0.075 
2012 0.188 0.267 0.800 -0.122 0.113 0.076 
2013 0.188 0.267 0.803 -0.125 0.111 0.076 
              
Germany (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.191 0.279 0.814 -0.159 0.108 0.078 
2006 0.193 0.286 0.808 -0.166 0.110 0.080 
2007 0.192 0.287 0.802 -0.163 0.110 0.080 
2008 0.193 0.288 0.805 -0.165 0.111 0.081 
2009 0.190 0.280 0.805 -0.158 0.108 0.078 
2010 0.192 0.283 0.803 -0.155 0.110 0.079 
2011 0.192 0.283 0.798 -0.148 0.113 0.079 
2012 0.189 0.275 0.798 -0.139 0.112 0.078 
2013 0.194 0.287 0.801 -0.156 0.113 0.081 
              
Denmark (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.166 0.217 0.908 -0.159 0.079 0.061 
2005 0.163 0.212 0.903 -0.146 0.079 0.059 
2006 0.167 0.219 0.904 -0.157 0.078 0.061 
2007 0.176 0.238 0.913 -0.187 0.079 0.066 
2008 0.191 0.266 0.922 -0.222 0.080 0.074 
2009 0.167 0.220 0.898 -0.155 0.080 0.061 
2010 0.166 0.218 0.884 -0.141 0.082 0.061 
2011 0.172 0.231 0.877 -0.152 0.086 0.064 
2012 0.170 0.227 0.880 -0.147 0.085 0.064 
2013 0.175 0.240 0.862 -0.151 0.088 0.067 
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Finland (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.187 0.268 0.838 -0.166 0.101 0.075 
2005 0.190 0.275 0.829 -0.165 0.105 0.077 
2006 0.190 0.275 0.827 -0.165 0.105 0.275 
2007 0.189 0.274 0.815 -0.152 0.108 0.077 
2008 0.189 0.274 0.814 -0.154 0.106 0.077 
2009 0.187 0.271 0.820 -0.156 0.104 0.076 
2010 0.187 0.271 0.819 -0.157 0.104 0.076 
2011 0.188 0.272 0.822 -0.157 0.105 0.076 
2012 0.189 0.274 0.825 -0.162 0.105 0.077 
2013 0.187 0.267 0.826 -0.154 0.105 0.075 
              
Ireland (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.216 0.323 0.773 -0.135 0.141 0.092 
2005 0.217 0.325 0.776 -0.142 0.142 0.093 
2006 0.223 0.336 0.789 -0.161 0.145 0.096 
2007 0.222 0.334 0.786 -0.156 0.147 0.096 
2008 0.215 0.321 0.791 -0.155 0.138 0.092 
2009 0.206 0.304 0.787 -0.139 0.134 0.087 
2010 0.206 0.305 0.797 -0.151 0.131 0.087 
2011 0.202 0.299 0.789 -0.144 0.131 0.086 
2012 0.204 0.308 0.784 -0.154 0.130 0.087 
2013 0.202 0.301 0.792 -0.151 0.128 0.086 
              
Luxembourg (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.189 0.274 0.799 -0.135 0.113 0.077 
2005 0.192 0.280 0.785 -0.127 0.116 0.079 
2006 0.203 0.305 0.770 -0.136 0.129 0.087 
2007 0.209 0.311 0.788 -0.148 0.131 0.088 
2008 0.211 0.317 0.793 -0.158 0.133 0.090 
2009 0.204 0.301 0.806 -0.156 0.126 0.086 
2010 0.200 0.293 0.807 -0.153 0.123 0.083 
2011 0.196 0.281 0.804 -0.133 0.123 0.080 
2012 0.194 0.277 0.809 -0.133 0.119 0.079 
2013 0.198 0.288 0.801 -0.144 0.118 0.082 
              
Netherlands (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.172 0.232 0.863 -0.142 0.092 0.065 
2006 0.174 0.232 0.890 -0.156 0.090 0.065 
2007 0.179 0.243 0.889 -0.174 0.091 0.068 
2008 0.181 0.247 0.890 -0.177 0.091 0.069 
2009 0.180 0.247 0.878 -0.171 0.092 0.069 
2010 0.175 0.234 0.880 -0.152 0.092 0.066 
2011 0.175 0.235 0.878 -0.154 0.092 0.066 
2012 0.175 0.235 0.880 -0.156 0.091 0.066 
2013 0.171 0.228 0.887 -0.151 0.089 0.064 
              
Sweden (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.164 0.214 0.871 -0.122 0.085 0.060 
2005 0.168 0.224 0.874 -0.142 0.087 0.063 
2006 0.166 0.221 0.865 -0.132 0.086 0.062 
2007 0.166 0.221 0.869 -0.134 0.086 0.062 
2008 0.169 0.226 0.862 -0.133 0.088 0.063 
2009 0.171 0.232 0.858 -0.140 0.088 0.065 
2010 0.170 0.230 0.854 -0.133 0.089 0.064 
2011 0.172 0.235 0.842 -0.128 0.092 0.066 
2012 0.174 0.240 0.831 -0.125 0.095 0.068 
2013 0.175 0.242 0.833 -0.130 0.096 0.068 
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United Kingdom (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.223 0.355 0.762 -0.177 0.145 0.101 
2006 0.211 0.329 0.752 -0.145 0.142 0.093 
2007 0.211 0.329 0.759 -0.155 0.136 0.093 
2008 0.217 0.339 0.762 -0.163 0.141 0.096 
2009 0.210 0.325 0.768 -0.158 0.136 0.092 
2010 0.213 0.330 0.766 -0.159 0.140 0.094 
2011 0.213 0.332 0.770 -0.165 0.138 0.094 
2012 0.208 0.317 0.786 -0.168 0.129 0.090 
2013 0.202 0.301 0.782 -0.143 0.130 0.086 
              
CEE NMS-8             
              
Cyprus (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.199 0.295 0.782 -0.139 0.122 0.083 
2006 0.202 0.301 0.795 -0.156 0.120 0.085 
2007 0.207 0.313 0.802 -0.175 0.118 0.088 
2008 0.200 0.295 0.799 -0.152 0.117 0.083 
2009 0.203 0.303 0.789 -0.149 0.122 0.085 
2010 0.205 0.309 0.786 -0.154 0.124 0.087 
2011 0.202 0.301 0.785 -0.143 0.122 0.085 
2012 0.214 0.326 0.790 -0.169 0.130 0.092 
2013 0.219 0.333 0.794 -0.173 0.136 0.095 
              
Czech Republic (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.186 0.257 0.847 -0.147 0.099 0.072 
2006 0.182 0.250 0.861 -0.155 0.100 0.071 
2007 0.180 0.246 0.866 -0.153 0.099 0.069 
2008 0.178 0.240 0.875 -0.154 0.096 0.068 
2009 0.179 0.244 0.875 -0.161 0.096 0.069 
2010 0.180 0.248 0.866 -0.162 0.097 0.070 
2011 0.180 0.249 0.857 -0.153 0.100 0.070 
2012 0.177 0.243 0.862 -0.152 0.096 0.068 
2013 0.177 0.240 0.871 -0.155 0.094 0.067 
              
Estonia (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.220 0.358 0.719 -0.145 0.156 0.101 
2005 0.208 0.326 0.744 -0.142 0.138 0.092 
2006 0.205 0.315 0.757 -0.138 0.135 0.089 
2007 0.206 0.314 0.767 -0.145 0.132 0.089 
2008 0.200 0.298 0.765 -0.123 0.128 0.085 
2009 0.199 0.294 0.768 -0.122 0.128 0.084 
2010 0.197 0.293 0.768 -0.127 0.127 0.083 
2011 0.200 0.303 0.758 -0.128 0.132 0.086 
2012 0.204 0.310 0.757 -0.130 0.137 0.088 
2013 0.206 0.313 0.761 -0.137 0.137 0.089 
              
Hungary (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.188 0.269 0.830 -0.160 0.102 0.075 
2006 0.206 0.318 0.795 -0.185 0.119 0.089 
2007 0.185 0.265 0.823 -0.151 0.104 0.074 
2008 0.182 0.255 0.833 -0.143 0.103 0.072 
2009 0.180 0.250 0.834 -0.137 0.101 0.071 
2010 0.179 0.245 0.837 -0.128 0.103 0.069 
2011 0.191 0.272 0.809 -0.135 0.114 0.077 
2012 0.187 0.268 0.813 -0.140 0.109 0.075 
2013 0.187 0.268 0.811 -0.141 0.107 0.076 
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Lithuania (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.219 0.354 0.731 -0.153 0.153 0.100 
2006 0.214 0.336 0.746 -0.147 0.146 0.096 
2007 0.212 0.332 0.753 -0.151 0.142 0.094 
2008 0.214 0.335 0.752 -0.150 0.141 0.095 
2009 0.218 0.347 0.757 -0.168 0.144 0.098 
2010 0.218 0.351 0.741 -0.164 0.145 0.099 
2011 0.205 0.316 0.752 -0.136 0.137 0.090 
2012 0.206 0.313 0.763 -0.137 0.138 0.089 
2013 0.212 0.331 0.759 -0.153 0.142 0.094 
              
Poland (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.217 0.357 0.719 -0.152 0.149 0.101 
2006 0.206 0.320 0.752 -0.143 0.136 0.091 
2007 0.203 0.311 0.767 -0.149 0.129 0.088 
2008 0.203 0.309 0.774 -0.152 0.128 0.087 
2009 0.202 0.306 0.771 -0.144 0.127 0.086 
2010 0.202 0.307 0.767 -0.144 0.128 0.087 
2011 0.202 0.308 0.768 -0.147 0.128 0.087 
2012 0.199 0.301 0.769 -0.139 0.126 0.085 
2013 0.198 0.300 0.770 -0.140 0.125 0.085 
              
Slovenia (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.172 0.234 0.846 -0.132 0.093 0.066 
2006 0.173 0.234 0.843 -0.126 0.096 0.066 
2007 0.172 0.233 0.847 -0.129 0.093 0.066 
2008 0.171 0.233 0.842 -0.128 0.093 0.066 
2009 0.170 0.230 0.848 -0.126 0.092 0.065 
2010 0.173 0.236 0.839 -0.126 0.095 0.067 
2011 0.174 0.237 0.836 -0.124 0.096 0.067 
2012 0.173 0.236 0.837 -0.123 0.095 0.066 
2013 0.175 0.242 0.829 -0.126 0.096 0.068 
              
Slovakia (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2005 0.186 0.267 0.816 -0.148 0.104 0.075 
2006 0.196 0.288 0.837 -0.187 0.102 0.080 
2007 0.178 0.245 0.836 -0.135 0.100 0.069 
2008 0.177 0.244 0.831 -0.127 0.100 0.069 
2009 0.181 0.254 0.823 -0.137 0.104 0.072 
2010 0.182 0.257 0.823 -0.140 0.103 0.072 
2011 0.181 0.255 0.825 -0.138 0.102 0.071 
2012 0.180 0.252 0.812 -0.117 0.107 0.072 
2013 0.176 0.240 0.827 -0.115 0.102 0.068 
              
Other countries             
              
Iceland (2004-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.177 0.244 0.855 -0.152 0.093 0.068 
2005 0.179 0.248 0.866 -0.163 0.093 0.069 
2006 0.185 0.260 0.856 -0.170 0.097 0.073 
2007 0.196 0.283 0.854 -0.189 0.104 0.080 
2008 0.191 0.273 0.852 -0.180 0.100 0.077 
2009 0.202 0.296 0.856 -0.202 0.105 0.084 
2010 0.181 0.254 0.860 -0.170 0.095 0.072 
2011 0.172 0.231 0.878 -0.151 0.088 0.065 
2012 0.175 0.237 0.864 -0.145 0.095 0.067 
2013 0.176 0.240 0.859 -0.146 0.094 0.068 
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Norway (2005-2013) DER Alienation Identification Correlation FW EGR 
2004 0.188 0.263 0.917 -0.219 0.081 0.073 
2005 0.192 0.273 0.916 -0.232 0.081 0.076 
2006 0.200 0.293 0.895 -0.236 0.087 0.082 
2007 0.168 0.228 0.869 -0.152 0.083 0.063 
2008 0.173 0.237 0.886 -0.174 0.083 0.066 
2009 0.171 0.232 0.877 -0.161 0.084 0.064 
2010 0.170 0.229 0.887 -0.163 0.083 0.064 
2011 0.166 0.220 0.888 -0.149 0.083 0.061 
2012 0.165 0.218 0.887 -0.148 0.081 0.061 




      
 
 
Table B2: Polarization by 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator, 𝐹𝑊 indicator and 𝐸𝐺𝑅 indicator, 2013 
  𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator (𝛼 = 0.5) 𝐹𝑊 indicator 𝐸𝐺𝑅 indicator 
  Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank 
Norway 0.164 (1) 0.080 (1) 0.060 (1) 
Denmark 0.171 (2) 0.089 (3) 0.064 (2) 
Slovenia 0.175 (3) 0.088 (2) 0.067 (3) 
Sweden 0.175 (4) 0.096 (6) 0.068 (7) 
Netherlands 0.175 (5) 0.096 (7) 0.068 (8) 
Iceland 0.176 (6) 0.102 (8) 0.068 (6) 
Czech Republic 0.176 (7) 0.094 (5) 0.068 (5) 
Slovakia 0.177 (8) 0.094 (4) 0.067 (4) 
Hungary 0.187 (9) 0.107 (10) 0.076 (10) 
Belgium 0.187 (10) 0.105 (9) 0.075 (9) 
Germany 0.188 (11) 0.111 (11) 0.076 (11) 
Finland 0.190 (12) 0.113 (13) 0.079 (12) 
Austria 0.194 (13) 0.113 (12) 0.081 (13) 
Luxembourg 0.198 (14) 0.118 (14) 0.082 (14) 
Poland 0.198 (15) 0.125 (15) 0.085 (15) 
Estonia 0.202 (16) 0.130 (17) 0.086 (17) 
Ireland 0.202 (17) 0.128 (16) 0.086 (16) 
Lithuania 0.206 (18) 0.137 (19) 0.089 (18) 
United Kingdom 0.212 (19) 0.142 (20) 0.094 (19) 
Cyprus 0.219 (20) 0.136 (18) 0.095 (20) 




0.077   
 
Note: According to Duro (2005b), that 𝐸𝐺𝑅  indicator structured around three groups gives the best   
simplified description of income distribution. Therefore, we compute the 𝐸𝐺𝑅 indicator by dividing 
the distribution into three groups. We also calculated the 𝐸𝐺𝑅 indicator around 2, 4 and 5 groups; 
the results are robust. 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC.  
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Table B3: Change in income polarization expressed by different polarization indicators, 2004-2013 (𝐷𝐸𝑅 𝛼 = 0.5) 
 























Norway 0.188  0.164  -0.025  (1) 0.081 0.080 -0.001 (10) 0.073 0.060 -0.013 (3) 
United Kingdom 0.223  0.202  -0.021  (2) 0.145 0.130 -0.016 (3) 0.101 0.086 -0.015 (2) 
Poland 0.217  0.198  -0.019  (3) 0.149 0.125 -0.024 (1) 0.101 0.085 -0.016 (1) 
Estonia 0.220  0.206  -0.014  (4) 0.156 0.137 -0.018 (2) 0.101 0.089 -0.012 (4) 
Ireland 0.216  0.202  -0.013  (5) 0.141 0.128 -0.014 (4) 0.092 0.086 -0.007 (6) 
Slovakia 0.186  0.176  -0.010  (6) 0.104 0.102 -0.002 (9) 0.075 0.068 -0.007 (5) 
Czech Republic 0.186  0.177  -0.009  (7) 0.099 0.094 -0.005 (6) 0.072 0.067 -0.005 (8) 
Lithuania 0.219  0.212  -0.007  (8) 0.153 0.142 -0.011 (5) 0.100 0.094 -0.006 (7) 
Hungary 0.188  0.187  -0.001  (9) 0.102 0.107 0.006 (16) 0.075 0.076 0.000 (12) 
Iceland 0.177  0.176  -0.001  (10) 0.093 0.094 0.001 (11) 0.068 0.068 -0.001 (11) 
Finland 0.187  0.187  0.000  (11) 0.101 0.105 0.004 (13) 0.075 0.075 0.000 (13) 
Netherlands 0.172  0.171  0.000  (12) 0.092 0.089 -0.003 (7) 0.065 0.064 -0.001 (9) 
Belgium 0.188  0.188  0.000  (13) 0.114 0.111 -0.003 (8) 0.077 0.076 -0.001 (10) 
Slovenia 0.172  0.175  0.003  (14) 0.093 0.096 0.003 (12) 0.066 0.068 0.002 (14) 
Germany 0.191  0.194  0.004  (15) 0.108 0.113 0.005 (14) 0.078 0.081 0.003 (15) 
Austria 0.183  0.190  0.007  (16) 0.105 0.113 0.009 (17) 0.073 0.079 0.006 (17) 
Luxembourg 0.189  0.198  0.009  (17) 0.113 0.118 0.005 (15) 0.077 0.082 0.005 (16) 
Denmark 0.166  0.175  0.010  (18) 0.079 0.088 0.010 (18) 0.061 0.067 0.007 (18) 
Sweden 0.164  0.175  0.012  (19) 0.085 0.096 0.011 (19) 0.060 0.068 0.008 (19) 
Cyprus 0.199  0.219  0.020  (20) 0.122 0.136 0.014 (20) 0.083 0.095 0.011 (20) 
    
  
    
  
    
  
  
Mean 0.191 0.189 -0.003   0.112 0.110 -0.001   0.079 0.077 -0.002   
Coefficient of variation 0.094 0.077 -0.017   0.214 0.161 -0.053   0.166 0.130 -0.036   
 
Note: Countries are ranked in order of the changes of the DER indicator from lowest to highest. 




Figure B1: Correlation between changes in the 𝐷𝐸𝑅 indicator and other polarization indicators, 
2004-2013 (𝐷𝐸𝑅 𝛼 = 0.5) 
Panel a: 𝐷𝐸𝑅 and 𝐹𝑊 indicators                 Panel b: 𝐷𝐸𝑅 and 𝐸𝐺𝑅 indicators 
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC.  
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Appendix C. Polarization’s sensitivity to different values of 𝜶 
Table C1: Sensitivity analysis of polarization indicator 𝐷𝐸𝑅 for a range of values for 𝛼, 2013 
  𝛼 = 0 (Gini) 𝛼 = 0.25 𝛼 = 0.5 𝛼 = 0.75 𝛼 = 1 
Country Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank 
Norway 0.216 (1) 0.181 (1) 0.164 (1) 0.155 (1) 0.150 (4) 
Netherlands 0.228 (2) 0.190 (2) 0.171 (2) 0.162 (5) 0.157 (11) 
Denmark 0.240 (3) 0.197 (3) 0.175 (3) 0.163 (6) 0.155 (7) 
Sweden  0.242 (8) 0.199 (6) 0.175 (4) 0.160 (4) 0.149 (3) 
Slovenia 0.242 (7) 0.200 (8) 0.175 (5) 0.159 (2) 0.148 (1) 
Slovakia 0.240 (5) 0.200 (7) 0.176 (6) 0.159 (3) 0.148 (2) 
Iceland 0.240 (6) 0.198 (5) 0.176 (7) 0.163 (7) 0.155 (9) 
Czech 
Republic 
0.240 (4) 0.198 (4) 0.177 (8) 0.165 (8) 0.159 (13) 
Hungary 0.268 (11) 0.216 (10) 0.187 (9) 0.168 (10) 0.155 (8) 
Finland 0.267 (9) 0.214 (9) 0.187 (10) 0.170 (12) 0.159 (12) 
Belgium 0.267 (10) 0.217 (11) 0.188 (11) 0.169 (11) 0.155 (6) 
Austria 0.282 (12) 0.223 (12) 0.190 (12) 0.168 (9) 0.152 (5) 
Germany 0.287 (13) 0.226 (13) 0.194 (13) 0.174 (14) 0.160 (14) 
Luxembourg 0.288 (14) 0.229 (14) 0.198 (14) 0.178 (15) 0.164 (17) 
Poland 0.300 (15) 0.235 (15) 0.198 (15) 0.174 (13) 0.157 (10) 
United 
Kingdom 
0.301 (16) 0.237 (17) 0.202 (16) 0.179 (16) 0.163 (16) 
Ireland 0.301 (17) 0.236 (16) 0.202 (17) 0.182 (18) 0.168 (19) 
Estonia 0.313 (18) 0.246 (18) 0.206 (18) 0.180 (17) 0.162 (15) 
Lithuania 0.331 (19) 0.255 (19) 0.212 (19) 0.186 (19) 0.167 (18) 
Cyprus 0.333 (20) 0.256 (20) 0.219 (20) 0.196 (20) 0.181 (20) 
                      
Mean 20 0.251   0.500   0.191   0.434   0.159   
Coefficient of 
variation 
0.135   0.043   0.076   0.024   0.049   
 





Appendix D. Nature of decomposing a polarization change into growth and reallocation effects 
Based on Kakwani’s (2000) axiomatic approach, the nature of decomposing a polarization change 
into growth and reallocation effects can be described through three axioms:  
 
Axiom 1: If 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) = 0 , then ∆𝑝(𝑥) = 𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1)  and if 𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) = 0, then ∆𝑝(𝑥) = 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1)   
If the growth effect (reallocation effect) is equal to zero, then the change in polarization is 
entirely dependent on a change in inequality (change in mean income). Further, if the growth and 
reallocation effects are both equal to zero, then polarization does not change between the two 
periods. 
 
Axiom 2: If 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) ≤ 0 and 𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) ≤ 0, then ∆𝑝(𝑥) ≤ 0, and if 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) ≥ 0 and 𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) ≥ 0, 
then ∆𝑝(𝑥) ≥ 0. 
This axiom indicates that if both the growth and reallocation effects are less (greater) than 
zero, total polarization change must be less (greater) than zero. If, however, 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) ≤ 0 (≥ 0) 
but 𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1)  ≥ 0 (≤ 0), then the total change in polarization would be determined by the 
magnitude of 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) and 𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1). Note that 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) ≤ 0 (≥) implies that change in the 
mean source income x has a favorable effect on the polarization.  
Axiom 3: 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) = − 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) and 𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) = − 𝐺(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) 
𝐺 (
𝑡,
 𝑡 + 1
) and 𝐷(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) are the growth and reallocation effects when one moves from the 
terminal year 𝑡 + 1 to the initial year 𝑡. The effects should be of the same magnitude but with 
opposite signs when going from the initial year 𝑡 to the terminal year 𝑡 + 1. This axiom guarantees 
symmetry between the initial and terminal periods. Avoiding the Axiom 3 may give rise to the 
problem of nominating the initial or the terminal year as the reference.  
 
Applying these axioms to decomposing polarization helps us to overcome two limitations: 
the residual term and the use of the ‘benchmark period’ problem. The first two axioms ensure 
that ∆𝑝(𝑥) is linear and additive and the third axiom guarantees symmetry. 
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Appendix E: Detailed decomposition change DER indicator 2004-2008 and 2008-2013 (𝜶 = 0.5) 
Table E1: Detailed decomposition change DER indicator 2004-2008 (𝛼 = 0.5) 











Partial effect: Market 
income 
Partial effect: Social 
Benefit 
Partial effect: Taxes 
    



















West EU-10                         
Denmark 2004-2008 0.166 0.191 0.025 0.001 0.024 0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.008 
Luxembourg 2004-2008 0.189 0.212 0.022 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.006 
Netherlands 2005-2008 0.172 0.181 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.004 
Belgium 2004-2008 0.188 0.194 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Sweden  2004-2008 0.164 0.169 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
Germany 2005-2008 0.191 0.193 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
Austria 2005-2008 0.186 0.188 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
Finland 2004-2008 0.187 0.189 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Ireland 2004-2008 0.216 0.215 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.008 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
United Kingdom 2005-2008 0.223 0.217 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
Mean-10   0.188 0.195 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
                          
CEE NMS-8                         
Cyprus 2005-2008 0.199 0.200 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Slovenia 2005-2008 0.172 0.171 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Czech Republic 2006-2008 0.182 0.178 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.010 -0.007 -0.007 0.003 -0.003 0.000 
Lithuania 2005-2008 0.219 0.214 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.020 -0.013 -0.015 0.005 -0.006 0.002 
Hungary 2005-2008 0.188 0.182 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
Poland 2005-2008 0.217 0.203 -0.015 0.000 -0.014 0.014 -0.016 -0.011 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
Slovakia 2006-2008 0.196 0.177 -0.019 0.000 -0.018 0.009 -0.015 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
Estonia 2004-2008 0.220 0.200 -0.020 -0.001 -0.020 0.013 -0.018 -0.012 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Mean-8   0.199 0.191 -0.008 0.000 -0.008 0.010 -0.010 -0.007 0.001 -0.003 0.000 
                          
Other                         
Norway 2004-2008 0.188 0.173 -0.015 0.000 -0.015 0.006 -0.011 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
Iceland 2004-2008 0.177 0.191 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.004 
                          
Mean-20   0.192 0.193 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
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Table E2: Detailed decomposition change DER indicator 2008-2013 (𝛼 = 0.5) 
 











Partial effect: Market 
income 
Partial effect: Social 
Benefit 
Partial effect: Taxes 


















West EU-10       
  
    
  
    
Sweden  2008-2013 0.169 0.175 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.010 0.000 -0.007 0.005 -0.002 0.002 
Austria 2008-2013 0.188 0.190 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Germany 2008-2013 0.193 0.194 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Finland 2008-2013 0.189 0.187 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Belgium 2008-2013 0.194 0.188 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 
Netherlands 2008-2013 0.181 0.171 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
Ireland 2008-2013 0.215 0.202 -0.012 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 
Luxembourg 2008-2013 0.212 0.198 -0.014 0.000 -0.013 0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
United Kingdom 2008-2013 0.217 0.202 -0.015 0.001 -0.016 -0.017 0.011 0.011 -0.013 0.007 -0.014 
Denmark 2008-2013 0.191 0.175 -0.016 0.000 -0.016 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.010 
Mean-10   0.195 0.188 -0.006 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 
                          
CEE NMS-8                       
Cyprus 2008-2013 0.200 0.219 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.002 
Estonia 2008-2013 0.200 0.206 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
Hungary 2008-2013 0.182 0.187 0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.012 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.001 
Slovenia 2008-2013 0.171 0.175 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Lithuania 2008-2013 0.214 0.212 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.003 
Czech Republic 2008-2013 0.178 0.177 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Slovakia 2008-2013 0.177 0.176 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.006 0.005 
Poland 2008-2013 0.203 0.198 -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Mean-8   0.191 0.194 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
                          
Other                         
Iceland 2008-2013 0.191 0.176 -0.014 0.001 -0.016 -0.004 0.006 0.010 -0.009 -0.005 -0.013 
Norway 2008-2013 0.173 0.164 -0.010 0.000 -0.009 0.011 -0.009 -0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
                          
Mean-20   0.192 0.189 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC.  
